The seed industry has been in a state of restructuring for many years now. New firms have entered the industry and old players have merged. Firms from various backgrounds now compete in supplying seed to agriculture and horticulture: traditional seed companies, new biotechnology firms, agrochemical companies, food processors and wholesalers/retailers. As biotechnology enables the enhancement of various quality attributes of agricultural products, downstream companies in the agrifood industry have become interested in co-deciding on plant breeding goals. Advances in plant biotechnology lead to more integrated agrifood chains. Access to proprietary genes and technology is essential for developing and commercializing genetically modified varieties. Dispute and uncertainty over intellectual property rights have induced mergers, take-overs and strategic alliances.
Introduction
Agricultural biotechnology has had a great impact on the structure of plant breeding and seed production. It is through the development of new, improved varieties of agricultural and horticultural crops, that the results of agricultural biotechnology research are commercialised. Plant biotechnology research is targeted at two main goals: enhanced pest resistance and improved quality. Both have implications for the structure of the seed industry. The emphasis on pest control has been triggered by the public concern over the use of chemical pesticides. Farmers are urged to diminish the use of agrochemicals. This can be done by selecting plant varieties with enhanced resistance traits. As a result farmers will spend relatively less on pesticides and more on seed. The increased attention, from processors and consumers, for quality aspects of the agricultural products has led plant breeders to take a broader set of demands into consideration when developing new varieties. Not only agronomic traits demanded by the farmer, but also quality aspects demanded by processors, traders, retailers and consumers are incorporated into the plant breeding process. Seed companies, food processors and traders/retailers increasingly collaborate in deciding on the goals of plant breeding programmes. But also agrochemical companies have become major stakeholders in the seed industry.
This article analyses the role of the various actors involved in plant biotechnology. We start with a little history on how and why firms from different industries became active in plant biotechnology research. Then we discuss the 'natural' alliance between plant breeding and the production of agrochemicals. Next we move to the integration of the three main groups of companies involved in agricultural biotechnology: agrochemical companies, seed companies and new biotechnology firms. We will elaborate two cases of biotechnology companies, one a new biotechnology firm (PGS), the other an established agrochemical company (Monsanto) . With growing attention for quality aspects of food production and the need for product differentiation, food processors and food retailers have become more involved in setting the agenda for plant breeding goals. As processors and retailers are the gatekeepers to the consumer, they also play a major role in the commercialisation of plant biotechnology. A final issue that is being discussed in this article is the role of intellectual property rights. There is competition between the seed and biotechnology companies not only over the best plant varieties and access to consumers, but also over the ownership of genes and techniques.
The rise of plant biotechnology
Since investments in agricultural biotechnology research really started to augment in the early 1980s, three kinds of firms have been involved: new biotechnology firms (NBFs), large agrochemical companies and seed producers. Each group had its own strategic reasons for investing in plant biotechnology.
The first NBFs were founded in the USA in the late 1970s. In 1976 Genentech (San Francisco, CA) was the first of a series of NBFs fully dedicated to exploit the commercial potential of biotechnology R&D. In the 1980s Europe also followed in establishing these new small research firms. Many of the NBFs were started by university scientists, who realised the commercial value of their research. Often they wanted simultaneously to retain their professorship in order to keep up with the latest scientific advances and to participate in the exploitation of their knowledge and expertise. Funds for starting these NBFs came from venture capital, stock offerings and contract research for established companies. The main clients of the NBFs were large established companies in the agrochemical, pharmaceutical, seed and food industries. Given the high risk and fundamental nature of early biotechnology research, established companies preferred to buy biotechnology R&D above establishing their own biotechnology research units. The early years of biotechnology development showed a clear vertical division of labour between NBFs and established companies, with NBFs doing the biotechnology R&D and established companies taking responsibility for manufacturing, testing and distributing the resulting products [1] .
Major US NBFs specialising in plant biotechnology were Calgene, DNA Plant Technology, Mycogen, Agrigenetics and Agracetus. In Europe, a well known plant biotechnology NBF was Plant Genetic Systems (PGS) in Belgium. PGS was founded in 1983 by professor Van Montagu of Gent University. Van Montagu was one of the first, in 1983, to develop a transgenic plant [2] . In the Netherlands, several NBFs were funded, like MOGEN, Keygene and RZ Research. In the UK, AGC (later Axis) and Twyford were the most notable.
In an early stage of biotechnology research, the agrochemical (and pharmaceutical) industry acknowledged the scientific and commercial implications. Modifying living organisms like plants was very much related to their core research activities. Testing new pesticidal compounds and understanding resistance in plants requires thorough insight in biological processes. Besides the commonalties in research focus, the agrochemical industry had several other features that were beneficial to the development of plant biotechnology. The capital intensive and fundamental character of biotechnology research were not really new for an industry that is used to investing in R&D 5% or more of turnover. The industry had both funds and research experience available for establishing biotechnology labs, or sourcing biotechnology knowledge from NBFs. Also the industry was used to investing on a long term basis. Finally, the role of intellectual property protection, particularly with patents, was well established within the (agro)chemical industry. Knowledge of the legal procedures and experience with litigation have proven to be very valuable in protecting the results of biotechnology research, particularly in the USA.
Seed companies are the third group that has become engaged in research on plant biotechnology. Most of these firms have followed prudent strategies. They have invested only on a limited scale in biotechnology, (in-house or on contract), mainly because of the non-capital intensive nature of the seed business and because of a lack of experience with scientific research. In most countries scientific research on plant breeding has always been carried out by universities or other publicly funded research centres. Private plant breeders only did applied research and field testing. Now, with the rise of plant biotechnology, and with the restructuring of the publicly funded agricultural research, seed firms felt the need to enhance their investments in R&D in general and in biotechnology in particular. The seed industry followed basically two strategies to generate funds for investments in R&D. One route was by gaining economies of scale and scope through take-overs and mergers. Thus, in the 1980s a tremendous concentration in the seed industry took place. The other option was to let an agrochemical company take over the seed firm, which usually meant buying out the family that traditionally owned the seed company. But the need for funds were not the only reason why agrochemical companies and seed firms have become integrated; also it was expected that synergy between seed and pesticides could generate additional rents.
Agrochemicals and seed: a natural alliance?
Some twenty years ago, the markets for agricultural and horticultural seed and for agrochemicals, (pesticides, fertilisers), were still separate. Agrochemical companies, producing herbicides, insecticides, fungicides etc., were large companies, because of economies of scale in production and the high costs of product development, registration and testing. Seed firms, on the opposite, were small, often family-owned businesses. As new plant varieties have to fit the local and regional agro-ecological situation, plant breeding and seed production have always been a local and regional activity. Only for major agricultural crops, like maize (corn), soybeans and cotton, have large companies existed for quite some time. Not only the large scale production, particularly in the USA, but also the existence of hybrid varieties, which generate a higher rent for the seed company, have stimulated the growth of some suppliers of agricultural seeds. Now everything has changed, not least by the emergence of biotechnology.
In the 1970s and 1980s agrochemical companies took over many seed firms. Companies like Sandoz and Ciba Geigy in Switzerland, Shell and ICI in the UK, Rhône Poulenc and Sanofi (Elf Aquitaine) in France, and Upjohn, Monsanto, Lubrizol, DuPont and Pfizer in the USA, and Hoechst in Germany, all had sufficient funds available to establish themselves in the seed business. However, for some of these large companies the affair was only temporary. The expected synergy between agrochemicals and seed was not realised as quickly as expected. Large differences in organisational and managerial culture existed between the large industrial producers of chemicals on the one hand and the plant breeders and seed traders with their roots in farming, on the other hand. Moreover, profit figures were traditionally much lower in the seed industry than in the chemical industry. Exit Shell, Upjohn, Sanofi and ICI (partly), some within a couple of years, some just recently. Other companies were more persistent. Novartis, the 1996 merger of the Sandoz and Ciba Geigy, both of Basel, Switzerland, is not only the world's largest producer of agrochemicals (Table 1) , it is also the second largest seed firm ( Table  2 ). Other agrochemical companies who now have activities in the seed business are Monsanto, AgrEvo, DuPont, DowElanco and Rhône Poulenc. Some of these companies, notably Monsanto and AgrEvo, are still expanding their seed business activities.
The take-over of seed firms by agrochemical companies was not unexpected. The rise of environmental protection as a major political and economic issue has forced the producers of pesticides to reconsider their core activities. Criticism on the intensive use of pesticides in agricultural and horticultural production has led users of pesticides to find ways to lower the input. As plants still have to be protected from diseases and insect pests, alternatives are found in enhancing resistance in the plant itself. This shift in emphasis in plant protection, from external protection by pesticides to internal protection by improved resistance, is a long-term development, and has really materialised since the 1980s breakthrough in biotechnology research. In fact, biotechnology has led to a shift in the dominant paradigm of plant protection, from chemicals to genetics. Agrochemical companies try to compensate the loss of market growth in pesticides by market growth of new plant varieties with enhanced resistance.
The interest of the agrochemical industry for plant breeding and seed production has been most pronounced in the development of herbicide-resistant (or herbicide-tolerant) varieties. The development of genetically engineered herbicide-resistant plants was directly in line with the traditional research on how plants acquire resistance to certain herbicides [3] . As herbicides are the largest group of pesticides sold world wide, the economic stakes in extending the commercial life of currently used herbicides, i.e. beyond the duration of the patent, are huge. Herbicide-resistance provides this opportunity. Also the enormous increase in the cost of developing a new herbicide has provided an incentive to find ways to continue to sell existing products. 
Integration of biotechnology, agrochemicals and seed
In the early stage of biotechnology development, from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s, three separate groups of companies involved in plant biotechnology could be distinguished. Each group had its strategic reasons to invest in plant biotechnology research and each chose the most suitable organisational structure. However, from the second part of the 1980s it became clear that more integration was needed in order to fully reap the commercial benefits of biotechnology research. NBFs learned that only doing contract research was not a sustainable strategy, as most of the profits were to be gained in the manufacturing and marketing of new biotechnology products. Also, many established companies who used to be clients for the NBFs started to set up biotechnology labs themselves, or incorporated the NBFs in which they already were the majority shareholder.
The main reason for forward (by NBFs) and backward (by established companies) integration is the avoidance of transaction costs. For NBFs these transaction costs are particularly related to the problems of protecting intellectual property rights and in regulations which require extensive field testing. For established companies transaction costs increase as generic research projects result in concrete product development. In product development, much more of the know-how is idiosyncratic to the product as well as firm-specific. The need to integrate biotechnology research into traditional plant breeding processes and the difficulties (i.e. high transactions costs) that may rise if this has be done in collaboration between two independent firms, was sufficient reason for established companies to carry out biotechnology R&D themselves.
Both NBFs and agrochemical companies soon learned that the main route for full exploitation of the commercial opportunities of plant biotechnology research was by having access to existing and new varieties of agricultural and horticultural crops. The seed is the vehicle through which plant biotechnology is being commercialised [4] . Several NBFs chose to vertically integrate into the seed business. Calgene, Mycogen, DNA Plant Technology and PGS all started their own seeds activities, by taking over (small) seed companies or by establishing a new seed subsidiary. Also agrochemical companies which considered plant biotechnology as one of their core competences have continued to expand in the seed industry. Notable examples are Sandoz and Ciba Geigy (later merged into Novartis), Monsanto, DowElanco, ICI/Zeneca, Rhône Poulenc and AgrEvo.
For the plant biotechnology NBFs the vertical integration into the seed business did not generate the profits as expected. Seed production and marketing is a totally different business from high tech research. As NBFs remained small companies in the highly competitive seed market, they could not profit from economies of scale and scope to be gained in plant breeding, variety registration and maintaining marketing networks. By the mid 1990s there were hardly any independent NBFs left in plant biotechnology. Large established companies in agrochemicals, seeds or food products have either fully acquired the NBFs or have become dominant shareholders.
But also the traditional seed firms have not escaped restructuring. In the last decades the seed industry has undergone a continuous process of mergers, take-overs and joint ventures. Not only the necessary investments in expensive biotechnology R&D, but also improving efficiency to be able to compete in a more or less saturated market, lead to more and more concentration. One example is the 1996 merger between the Dutch Royal VanderHave Group and the English Zeneca Seeds. In fact, the new company, Advanta, is a joint venture between the parent companies (Cosun in the Netherlands and Zeneca in the UK). With a yearly turnover of about 420 million US $ Advanta is the sixth largest seed company in the world (table 2) . Biotechnology has been an important reason behind this merger. VanderHave had a strong biotechnology research unit, but was realising that in order to continue investing in R&D a larger sales base was needed. This minimum scale of production and sales was also needed to be a strong negotiation partner for those (biotechnology) companies who own most of the patents on genes and techniques.
Successfully competing in the market for agricultural and horticultural seeds requires access to three assets: germplasm, biotechnology and, to a lesser degree, capital. Originally, seed companies had the germplasm, incorporated in parent varieties and commercial varieties, the NBFs had the technology, and the agrochemical companies had capital. Now, every seed company must own all three assets, or must have access to them. Whether a company will integrate all three, will source them on a commercial basis, or will establish strategic alliances, depends on the core competences, strategies and market power of the firm. A company that has only invested moderately in biotechnology, but has access to the needed technology, is Pioneer Hi-Bred International. This largest seed producer in the world is by its sheer size an interesting partner for any biotechnology firm. Thus, Pioneer has signed strategic alliances with several NBFs, like Mycogen, CuraGen, Human Genome Sciences and Kimeragen. But even Pioneer is tightening its relationship with the agrochemical industry. In the fall of 1997 Pioneer and DuPont announced the formation of a research alliance and a joint venture, in order to develop and market transgenic varieties of maize (corn), soybeans and other oilseeds with enhanced oil, protein and carbohydrate composition. As part of this deal DuPont will invest 1.7 billion US$ in Pioneer, thus becoming owner of 20% of Pioneer stock [5] .
Although seed companies have become more active in plant biotechnology, both through in-house research and through investments in NBFs, it is clear that most of the plant biotechnology know how is in the hands of agrochemical companies. All major producers of pesticides (see Table 1 ) now have direct access to plant biotechnology expertise. The agrochemical companies are the main drivers behind the integration of agrochemical, biotechnology and seed. Two cases, one about Monsanto and the other about PGS show in more detail the strategies of integration.
The case of Monsanto Company
On 6 January 1997, a wave of unpleasant surprise went through the world wide seed industry. Monsanto Company of St. Louis, Missouri, USA, announced the take over of Holden's Foundation Seeds (including its marketing and sales representatives Corn States Hybrid Service and Corn States International). Monsanto was willing to pay more than 1 billion US$ for this acquisition. Holden's produces germplasm and inbreds (i.e. parent seeds) of maize used by retail seed companies to create hybrid seeds for farmers world wide. In the USA, more than 35% of the all the maize planted consists of varieties made with Holden's genetic material.
In early 1996 Monsanto had already made a major step in the maize seed business, by acquiring a 45% voting stake (worth 160 million US$) in DeKalb Genetics, after Pioneer the largest maize seed producer in the USA. With this share in DeKalb and its acquisition of Holden's, Monsanto has become, in a very short period of time, a major player in the US maize seed business. Clients of Holden's, mainly local and regional seed producers, no longer deal with a specialised maize breeder, but with a large agrochemical company with an aggressive marketing policy for its biotechnology expertise. The main goal for Monsanto to invest in maize breeding and seed production is to put its proprietary technology into as much seed as possible. "Holden's germplasm (...) will provide an excellent delivery mechanism for our biotechnology innovations in corn," said Monsanto's CEO Robert Shapiro [6] .
Monsanto was originally a manufacturer of agrochemicals and pharmaceuticals. Already in the early 1980s it made the strategic choice to become one of the most important agricultural biotechnology companies in the world. In the last 15 years Monsanto has spend more than 300 million US$ in plant biotechnology. This investment was made possible by the continuous and still growing profits from the sale of its herbicide Roundup. According to Monsanto itself, Roundup (active ingredient: glyphosate) is the most used broad spectrum herbicide in the world.
Monsanto's main goals in the commercialisation of biotechnology research are insect resistance and herbicide-resistance. Besides these agronomic traits, Monsanto is also investing in biotechnology research to improve quality characteristics. It expects that in the future the focus in plant biotechnology will shift pest control to quality improvement. The first steps in this direction have been set by acquiring Calgene and Agracetus. Both NBFs have patents to important techniques and genes, and both already have developed crop varieties with special quality traits. Calgene is well known for its long-shelf life tomato, Flavr Savr, and for its speciality canola seed oil. Agracetus has developed special cotton varieties with improved fibre characteristics.
Monsanto has always acknowledged that the commercialisation of its plant biotechnology research should be done through selling seeds of improved crop varieties. Access to the best available plant varieties is an essential part of this strategy. Depending on the structure of the seed market for a particular crop, Monsanto chooses between strategic alliances with major seed companies, for licensing its technology, or for developing and selling improved crops varieties itself. For insect-resistance cotton seed, Monsanto has a strategic alliance with Delta and Pineland, which already supplies 55% of the US cotton seed market. For herbicide-resistant soybeans it has given licences to several seed firms. But also is has become a main soybean seed supplier itself by acquiring, in September 1996, the agricultural seed division of Asgrow (for 240 million US $). It now has a market share of approximately 10% of the US soybean seed market. For the sale of insect-resistant seed potatoes it is has founded a new potato breeding company (NatureMark). Finally, through Calgene it has a major stake in Gargiulo, the largest producer and distributor of fresh tomatoes in the USA. Gargiulo is fully integrated, with breeding, production, handling and distribution of brand tomatoes all in one company.
Monsanto is the best example of a company using biotechnology for acquiring a new strategic position. With crop protection chemicals being a declining market in the Western world, Monsanto is using its plant biotechnology competence for two new strategic routes. One is the integrated sale of herbicides and seed (the so-called Roundup Ready varieties). The other is the incorporation in plant varieties of special quality traits. To be commercially successful these strategies require competences in both biotechnology (genes and techniques) and seed.
The case of Plant Genetic Systems
In August 1996 the German agrochemical company AgrEvo took over the Belgian NBF Plant Genetic Systems (PGS). The price AgrEvo, a joint venture of Hoechst and Schering, paid for this acquisition raised a lot of media attention: paying 730 million US$ for a firm with assets worth only 30 million US$ and which has never made a profit, is rather exceptional. This price was the outcome of a severe competition between several agrochemical giants. By acquiring PGS, AgrEvo became the owner of very advanced plant biotechnology expertise, several major patents on techniques and genes and a seed business in hybrid oilseeds. Hoechst is already active in the seed industry, through its ownership of the Dutch vegetable seed firm Nunhems Seeds and its 15% share in KWS, the largest seed firm in Germany and number nine on the world list (see table 2 ). AgrEvo's acquisition of PGS should be interpreted as a defensive move to ensure that none of its rivals did get its hands on a technology that is the key to the future of its plant biotechnology ambitions. With most of the NBFs partly or fully in the hands of large established companies, for AgrEvo it was now or never.
The willingness of AgrEvo and others to pay such a high price for PGS was induced by the expertise PGS has in plant biotechnology. Ever since its start in 1983, PGS has been one of the leading plant biotechnology firms. Its expertise lies in developing genetically modified plants, especially herbicide-resistant plants, insect-resistant plants and hybrids. Since the mid 1980s PGS has been working on herbicide-resistance. Originally it was this trait only as a selectable marker that was important in developing other transgenic plants. Later it started to do contract research for Hoechst, to develop transgenic plants with resistance to its herbicide gluphosinate-ammonium. This broad spectrum herbicide was originally marketed by Hoechst itself. Now it is sold by AgrEvo, under the brand names Basta or Finale. In North-America AgrEvo is already selling herbicide-resistant oilseed varieties, while in Europe both AgrEvo and PGS have applied for permission to sell transgenic varieties of oilseed and maize. These new varieties will be sold under the name of Liberty Link, with Liberty being the new formulation of gluphosinate-ammonium.
The second and even more important core biotechnology of PGS is insect-resistance. Bacterial genes coding for toxic proteins have been successfully incorporated in plant varieties, making these plants toxic for insects. The world's first insect-resistant plant was developed by PGS in 1985. The company received its first broad patent on insectresistant plants in 1993 and has been steadily reinforcing its patent estate ever since.
The third major technology that PGS has developed is a method to make hybrid crop varieties. The PGS hybrid technology, called the SeedLink-system, can be used for crops where traditional hybrid technology is too expensive or not effective. As hybrid varieties generate a higher value added for seed producers than conventional varieties, the PGS technology is of great commercial value. Seed firms prefer hybrids over conventional varieties because they give higher yields, because farmers have to buy new seed every year and because they provide good protection of intellectual property. PGS is using its SeedLink-system for developing hybrid varieties of oilseed, maize, rice and several vegetables. For developing and producing hybrid oilseeds PGS has established its own plant breeding programme and seed business, in Europe and in Canada. For developing hybrid rice it has a joint venture with Japan Tobacco, and for vegetables PGS has licensed its SeedLink-system to several vegetable seed companies in Europe.
Integration in the agrifood chain
In the early stages of plant biotechnology development, the emphasis was on plant protection goals. This explains the involvement of agrochemical companies in biotechnology research and, later, plant breeding and seed production. However, the greatest commercial potential of agricultural biotechnology in the (near) future lies in the ability to modify agricultural products to enhance desirable characteristics. Thus, biotechnology research is shifting its focus from pest control attributes to quality characteristics. Improving quality traits is on average much more difficult than enhancing (some) pest control attributes. But, as research in public and private laboratories advances, more and more options become available, like extending shelf life, improving taste, enhancing healthiness, increasing the content of certain compounds like sugar, starch or fatty-acids. Biotechnology research on quality attributes supports product differentiation in agriculture and horticulture.
This new focus in plant biotechnology research brings another group of companies into the analysis: companies that are situated at the downstream stages of the agrifood chain. Beyond the farm gate merchants and processors of farm products and wholesalers and retailers of food products are part of the agrifood chain. These industries, too, have become interested in the potentials of plant biotechnology, particularly the options for quality improvement. The food processors are particularly interested in those crops that undergo one or more stages of processing before reaching the consumer. For fresh products, wholesalers and retailers are the new alliance partners for plant breeders. Even without biotechnology, there has been a trend towards more vertical co-ordination in the agrifood chain [7] .
Thanks to biotechnology we now have many food processors, food service companies and food retailers directly or indirectly influencing plant breeding goals. Beer brewers look for new barley varieties with higher protein content that can make the brewing process more efficient. Food service companies become engaged in potato breeding to develop potato varieties that take up less fat during frying. A Dutch potato starch company has developed a potato variety with only one kind of starch (in stead of normally two) which will make the potato processing less polluting. Pasta producers demand wheat varieties with special protein content, in order to make product differentiation possible. Tomato ketchup producers have their own tomato breeding programmes in order to develop proprietary varieties that can enhance the quality of the final product. This short list of examples already shows that biotechnology can generate innovations at several stages of the agrifood chain: in cultivation (e.g. insect-resistant potato varieties need less pesticides), in processing (e.g. sugar beets with higher sugar content makes processing more efficient), and in storage and transportation (e.g. longer shelf life tomatoes).
A special case of integration in the agrifood chain are the so-called Identity Preserved Varieties (IPV). These are new crop varieties with characteristics that are maintained through the whole agrifood chain of production, processing and distribution. The preserved identity can be based on product attributes, like wheat with a higher protein content or tomatoes with a longer shelf life, or on production characteristics, as in the case of organic farming. An essential element in the development of IPV is that product differentiation takes place in the first stages of the agrifood chain, that is at the level of plant breeding and/or farming. While most of the product differentiation is generated at the level of food processing and retailing, IPV provide plant breeders and farmers an option to appropriate their share of the added value special products generate.
Developing special varieties and signing contracts with processors and/or retailers for the exclusive handling of crop products is just one way for seed companies to profit from the differentiation and quality trends in the market for food products. Another option is vertical integration in the whole agrifood chain, thus incorporating plant breeding, production, handling, processing and distribution. An example of this vertical integration trend in the agrifood chain is provided by the Mexican food and tobacco producer Empresas La Moderna (ELM). ELM started as a wholesaler of fresh fruit and vegetables, and has now diversified into the seed business. For vegetables, ELM controls the whole chain: it owns Seminis, with 22% of the market, the largest vegetable seed producer in the world, it has a majority stake in the US NBF DNA Plant Technology, it produces seedlings, and it handles and distributes fruit and vegetables, for instance through its US subsidiary Bionova and its European subsidiary Royal Van Namen. Only the production itself is contracted to farmers. In some countries, notably Mexico, ELM also provides the farmers with pesticides, capital and advice for cultivation.
Another example is Calgene, an NBF now fully owned by Monsanto, controlling the whole chain from variety development to wholesale for tomatoes with a longer shelf life. These Flavr Savr tomatoes have been developed by genetic engineering. Also for its speciality canola oil, Calgene is developing and selling the planting seed as well as processing and marketing oil.
Although vertical integration will become more pronounced in some parts of the agrifood system, notably the horticultural sector, most firms will look for other ways to exert their influence and to appropriate their share of higher profits. With more product differentiation in the agrifood system, one can expect to see more contracting between seed producers, farmers, processors and wholesalers/retailers. One issue that is of great importance for everyone who is involved in plant breeding and seed production is that of access to proprietary germplasm, genes and techniques, in other words the issue of intellectual property rights.
Intellectual property rights
Not only through its ability to create new directions in plant breeding has biotechnology influenced the restructuring of the world wide seed industry. It has also led to a fierce competition for the intellectual property rights of newly developed genes and techniques. Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), particularly patents, have been of exceptional importance in the development of commercial biotechnology, and have greatly influenced strategies of both NBFs and established companies in gaining access to genes and techniques.
For many NBFs, the discovery of genes and techniques that could subsequently be patented were the main strategic research goal. This proprietary knowledge was their main commercial asset, and was used to generate a continuous stream of income by licensing and to attract additional investors. Also for established companies carrying out biotechnology research, the proper protection of their discoveries were important strategic issues. A result of this 'race for patents' is that many companies claim very broad patents. In the early 1990s the US NBF Agracetus (now owned by Monsanto) was the first to obtain patent protection for the genetic engineering of cotton plants [8] .
Agracetus not only patented the technology, but also the resulting transgenic plants. It filed a similar broad patent application for transgenic soybeans. Thus, Agracetus claimed that its patents covered all transgenic plants, developed by whatever technology. Originally the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) awarded these broad patent claims. However, after strong opposition from scientists, other companies and societal interest groups, the USPTO rejected the patent claims in 1994. As a patent holder has full control over who may and who may not obtain a licence for using the technology, Agracetus would have had an enormous power over the commercial development of transgenic cotton and soybeans. Although the Agracetus case has made clear that such broad claims will not be rewarded, there is still large debate about the scope of the various patents, leading to many lawsuits -particularly in the USA -over alleged infringements of patents.
Besides the problem of broad patent claims plant breeders are faced with another IPR problem. Many of the techniques needed to develop a genetically modified plant have different owners. A plant breeder developing a transgenic variety not only has to consider the ownership of the gene he wants to incorporate in the new variety, but also of the various techniques used in the transformation process. In developing a transgenic insect resistant variety the following IPR elements are at stake: plant variety rights for the germplasm, two patents for the selectable marker gene, two patents for the trait to be incorporated, one patent for the transformation technology, and two patents for the gene expression technology [9] . All these patents, and the uncertainty about their scope, lead to laborious negotiation processes for licences. As a patent holder is not obliged to licence its technique, some techniques may not become available at all.
As a result of the proprietary nature of many of the techniques and genes and the often disputed IPR situation, access has become a major element in seed industry strategies. Many of the recent mergers, take-overs and strategic alliances in the biotechnology and seed business have been induced by the need to have access, now and in the future. One strategy is developing or acquiring sufficient proprietary technology to be able to use it as a trading chip in getting access to other techniques. Another strategy is becoming an interesting client for technology owners by controlling a large share of the seed market. As stated above, this was one of the reasons for the merger between VanderHave and Zeneca Seeds. Is has become clear in the seed business that there is no future without transgenic varieties, and that no transgenic varieties can be developed without access to genes and enabling technologies.
Conclusions
Biotechnology has had a great impact on the structure of the seed industry. It is a key technology for improving the genetic traits of crop plants, although it will not substitute traditional breeding methods. As an additional tool in plant breeding it enables the development of plant varieties with improved quality characteristics and enhanced pest resistance. The importance of this new technology and the far-reaching commercial implications it would have for both the seed industry and the agrochemical industry was first acknowledged by the latter. While originally most of the research work was done by NBFs, agrochemical companies were financing most of the research. In the beginning seed companies were more expectant. Soon, everyone involved in biotechnology research acknowledged the importance of seeds as the ultimate means for commercializing the outcome of research. Thus, the seed industry entered a phase of turmoil and restructuring. Numerous mergers, take-overs and strategic alliances have taken place between seed firms themselves, between seed firms and agrochemical companies, and between seed firms and NBFs. The many uncertainties surrounding the protection of intellectual property has even speeded up the restructuring. It has now become clear who will be the main players in the seed industry of the future. Biotechnology has definitely turned the agrochemical industry into an integrated agrochemical and seed industry.
